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Chinese governments have only ever tried twice to ex-ercise direct rule in Tibet. Each attempt has beenprimarily a military operation and has been marked
by fierce and recurrent resistance. The first attempt, a brief
occupation of Lhasa by a Chinese army in 1910-12, failed
after months of street fighting by Tibetan soldiers. That pe-
riod of direct rule led to exile for the Tibetan leadership, cre-
ated a crisis of identity for the nation, and caused deep bit-
terness among Tibetans towards those members of the elite
who were seen as collaborators, though it also triggered a
movement intent on modernisation. The second Chinese at-
tempt at direct rule is still underway, has had very similar re-
sults, and continues to meet considerable resistance. 
China reacquired control of Tibetan territory in 1950 and
nine years later finally replaced the traditional Tibetan gov-
ernment and began its second attempt at direct rule. Its man-
agement of Tibet saw three major waves of opposition in the
first 20 years: those of 1956-1958 in Eastern Tibet, 1959 in
Lhasa, and 1969 in Nyemo and other rural areas, as well as
guerrilla attacks by exiles based in Nepal from 1960 until
1974. Those episodes consisted largely of armed revolts or
attacks by unofficial armies, village-level bands, or guerrilla
forces. Since the death of Mao in 1976, there have been
consistent efforts toward the liberalisation of Chinese soci-
ety, with much greater tolerance of diversity, religion, and
travel. Tibetan protest under these conditions has consisted
mainly of street protests, most prominently the four major
demonstrations that took place between October 1987 and
March 1989, the long series of smaller demonstrations from
1989 to 1996, and the protests of March and April 2008,
which are still continuing. The two major waves of protest –
those of March 1989 and March 2008 – led to responses
that were primarily military: 13 months of martial law in
Lhasa from March 1989, and 15 months of paramilitary
presence in the streets of Lhasa and other Tibetan areas
from March 2008 until the time of writing this article (late
May 2009), with no sign of it being lifted. 
The waves of protest in Tibet in the post-1979 era were not
a reaction to doctrinaire communism. They came well after
China had started to do everything that the Maoist regime
had failed to do – improving the grassroots economy, open-
ing up to the outside world, allowing some religious practice,
celebrating cultural diversity, and encouraging some degree
of intellectual life. Tibetan protests in this new, reformist
China raised difficult questions. They differed from the
atomised and economy-driven protests typical of mainland
China – they were multiple actions taken by members of a
single nationality with shared values, and they were directed
against the state’s right to rule these areas. For some, they
appeared to be the opportunistic pursuit of local advantage
in China’s new prosperity, while others saw them as invok-
ing for China’s leaders the spectre of legitimacy failure
among their non-Chinese subjects. Whichever view is taken,
these cycles of unrest raised critical questions about the mod-
ern China project: What does it offer? Can it deal with dif-
ference? Whom does it include? 
The 2008 unrest in Tibet had significant political impact. It ce-
mented an international perception of China as authoritarian at
a moment when it seemed about to step beyond that at the Bei-
jing Olympics that August; it propelled the Tibet issue to near
the top of the agenda in Sino-US and Sino-European relations;
and it led to China dealing with Europe primarily through an
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Preliminary assessment of 95 of the 150 or more protests in Tibetan areas in the spring of 2008 suggests that they
were far more widespread than during previous unrest, and also that there was greater involvement of laypeople,
farmers, nomads, and students than in the past. It argues that the struggle in China and elsewhere over
representation of the unrest has been dominated by the question of violence, with little attention paid to policy
questions and social issues. This paper outlines the basic concepts that underlie that debate and summarises the
historical factors that might have led to protest.
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interdiction on its handling of Tibetan issues. It also led to a
major reassertion of military or paramilitary presence on the
ground in all Tibetan areas, a display of power that must have
had negative impact on local perceptions of the Chinese state. 
The Tibetan unrest, coupled with the protests over the
Olympic torch relays abroad, also changed the way politics
is done and thought about in China. The intense attacks that
emerged in both official and unofficial media in China
against foreign representations of the 2008 events were not
new in themselves – for decades if not centuries, political
acts by Tibetans have been reshaped to fit starkly conflicting
explanations by their neighbours and other interested par-
ties. But these were the first major Tibetan protests to occur
in the internet age, and they impelled young Chinese, the
so-called fenqing or “angry youth,” to deploy new technolo-
gies in inventive ways in their efforts to recover control of dis-
course for the Chinese nation from the international or
Western handling of this issue. 
In so doing, the Chinese activists, both at home and abroad,
created a new alliance of Chinese intellectuals with the state
and pushed the internal debate, and perhaps Party and gov-
ernmental policy, towards increasingly polarised positions.
These new positions in turn led to a change in political per-
ception within Tibet, where increasingly the socialist model
of negotiation between theoretically equal ethnic groups is
being replaced by a model of racial antagonism of a type as-
sociated with colonial administrations. A similar change
seems to have been taking place among policy-makers and
commentators in China who deal with Tibet. Among Ti-
betans within China, views are likely effected by changes on
the ground, such as increased restrictions, detentions, and
military presence, but the changes in China as a whole are
driven by representations – shifts in rhetoric, the media and
public argument – producing one of the critical asymmetries
that I discuss in this paper. 
The difficulty of carrying out research in Tibetan areas
means that the paper does not discuss what normally should
be the primary issue in any political or social interpretation
– the study of the thinking and experience of participants. (1)
Instead I look first at what is known of events in the spring
of 2008 and assess what aspects of these might have seemed
most important for political leaders and policy analysts in
China. Secondly, I look at the conflict over the representa-
tion of these events and at the dispute among outside play-
ers – Chinese, exile, Western, and so on – over how these
events should be interpreted and manipulated. 
The focus of the paper is on events within China rather than
on the exile or international arenas. As with any such study,
all the data presented here concerning events in Tibet are
provisional and are presented as general indicators only,
since no definitive ground studies have been done or are
likely to come to light. Similarly, terms such as Chinese, Ti-
betan, and Western are used in their most conventional
sense as guideline indicators only, since each group in-
evitably contains a vast array of different thoughts, percep-
tions, attitudes, and interests in their defence of either the
nation (a closely-bound community “united by factors such
as common descent, language, culture, history, or occupation
of the same territory, so as to form a distinct people,” accord-
ing to the Oxford English Dictionary) or the state (“the po-
litical organization which is the basis of civil government,”
ibid.).T he  p a tte rn of  p r ote st
In terms of information flow, the unrest of 2008 differed
from any previous phase of protest in Tibet. Few if any Ti-
betans were able to escape from Tibet in the 20 years after
the Dalai Lama fled in 1959, but since the early 1980s,
about 2,000 Tibetans a year have travelled from Tibet to set-
tle in India or the West, creating social networks that link
them with relatives or friends in their home areas. When
protests broke out in Lhasa in March 2008, the widespread
use of cellphone and internet technology in Tibet allowed in-
formation to travel rapidly to these Tibetans who had newly
arrived in exile, or directly to observers like myself. 
Within China, an unofficial reporting network was set up in
Beijing by the dissident Tibetan poet and blogger Woeser
(also spelt Oeser; Tib. ’Od zer, Ch. Weise) and her hus-
band, the Chinese writer Wang Lixiong, and scores of Ti-
betan intellectuals forwarded news from their areas that
were checked and published on her site, woeser.middle-
way.net. Most such reports were confirmed or elaborated by
Western news correspondents in Beijing using contacts in
the areas, (2) by exile organisations based in India, or by the
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1. Two important collections of opinions on the protests have been published privately in
Tibet: (a) ’Gar rtse ’Jigs med (ed.), Btsan po’i snying stobs (Fierce Courage), Vol. 1, pri-
vately published (probably in Amdo, 2008), and (b) Northwest Nationalities University
“The Eastern Conch Mountain” Editorial Group (Drolma, Kirti Kyab, Tsering Dorje et al.),
Shar dung ri, (The Eastern Conch Mountain) – [English title: The Eastern Snow
Mountain], Vol. 21 (2008). No place of publication or ISSN is given. About half the arti-
cles from this journal are published in English translation in A Great Mountain Burned By
Fire: China’s Crackdown In Tibet, ICT (International Campaign for Tibet), Washington,
D.C., March 2009, pp. 70-105.
2. The most important Western sources in Beijing were The Times (London), which estab-
lished its own network of sources, Associated Press, Reuters, The New York Times, Los
Angeles Times and The Washington Post, all of which independently verified reports they
received. Reports about some protests, such as those in Lhasa and Beijing, were
received directly.
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Tibetan service of Radio Free Asia, a broadcasting station
based in Washington DC and funded by the U.S. Congress,
which based its reports on telephone conversations with wit-
nesses. Exiles obtained and circulated on the internet unof-
ficial footage of non-violent protests in Labrang monastery in
Sangchu (Ch. Xiahe, Gansu), in Machu (Gansu), and,
later, at Lutsa monastery in Mangra (Qinghai). Western
news agencies obtained footage of incidents in Lhasa or
themselves filmed protests in Labrang (The Guardian, 1
March) and at Amchok Bora in Sangchu (Steve Chao for
Canadian TV, 15 March). For this survey I have only in-
cluded reports that were confirmed by witnesses, or that had
clearly separate sources containing details that indicated
first-hand knowledge. 
The process of verifying these reports was easier than in the
past because of a new policy by the Chinese authorities that
emerged at the beginning of the 2008 unrest of trying to
gain control of representations: the official media almost al-
ways responded, usually within 12 hours, to any report in the
foreign press of a Tibetan incident, usually confirming the
outlines of the report but characterising it differently. In one
or two cases where Tibetan protestors appeared in a bad
light, such as a protest involving violence, the official media
pre-empted Western publications. In two cases in Sichuan
the reports stated that security forces had opened fire, but
except in one account that was withdrawn the next day (3)
they did not admit to any killings of protestors. Footage of
protests in Lhasa and southern Gansu on 14-16 March was
broadcast on television in China, though only where it
showed violence by protestors. (4) Thus for the first time there
are a significant number of official reports of Tibetan unrest,
including rural incidents. These characterised protestors in
negative terms, but in doing so confirmed initial reports col-
lected by Woeser and others.
From cross-checking these reports it is clear that at least 95
separate protests took place in Tibetan areas within China
in the three and a half weeks from 10 March to 5 April
2008. The full number of incidents is likely to have been at
least 150, given the underreporting of incidents in remote vil-
lages and townships, particularly in Kanlho (Ch. Gannan, a
Tibetan area in the south of Gansu province (5)). 
These numbers seem small compared to the 80,000 or so
protests that are said to take place in China each year, many
of them rural disputes over land and corruption, often includ-
ing violence, which are apparently not regarded as a major
political challenge by the government or the Party. Why did
the authorities treat the Tibetan events differently, as a
threat requiring a coordinated, cross-regional military re-
sponse? Some of the reasons are clear – the Tibetan
protests had common objectives, showed signs of possible
coordination, had national and religious dimensions, had for-
eign implications and support, and disputed the govern-
ment’s right to rule rather than excesses by particular local
officials. Other factors are indicated by simple statistics.
These were the first street protests, in the sense of explicit
displays of opposition to Chinese rule, in Tibetan areas for
some 12 years. Small incidents had taken place in the previ-
ous two years – a sit-down protest against religious restric-
tions staged within the monastery of Drepung in Lhasa in
November 2005, a conflict among monks at Ganden
monastery over a controversial religious cult in 2006, sym-
bolic gestures about environmental and wildlife issues that
same year, a protest about graduate unemployment in Lhasa
also in 2006, flash-riots over ethnic conflicts in July 2007,
and a symbolic repainting of the Dalai Lama’s former resi-
dence to mark an award to him by the U.S. Congress in Oc-
tober 2007. But political street protests by Tibetans against
Chinese rule, even small-scale incidents, had come to an end
in 1996, apparently because the increasingly rapid responses
of security forces (teams in plainclothes placed at readiness
around the central temple, the main site for protests in
Lhasa) and the severity of prison sentences for protestors
(an average of around 6.5 years for any public protest, how-
ever brief) had made the practice no longer worthwhile for
protesters, especially since news of such incidents rarely
reached the outside world or attracted press attention. There
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3. The authorities admitted to killing four Tibetan protestors in Ngaba on 16 March (see
“URGENT: Four Rioters Shot Dead Sunday in Aba of SW China, Police sources,” March
20 (Xinhua), accessible at http://www.highbeam.com/Search.aspx?q=%22Four+
Rioters+Shot+Dead+Sunday+in+Aba+of+SW+China+Police+sources%22). The state-
ment was replaced without comment the following day by “Police: 4 rioters wounded in
Aba of Sichuan,” Xinhua, 21 March 2008 (see http://www.china.org.cn/2008-
03/21/content_13190976.htm). The original report is no longer available on official
Chinese websites.
4. See “The True Account of the Violent Events of Beating, Smashing, Looting and Burning
in some Counties and Townships in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture,” a 20-
minute compilation in Chinese of videos showing rioting 14-18 March in Kanlho
(Gannan, Southern Gansu) by Gannan TV and given to foreign journalists.
5. “150 incidents of ‘smashing, looting, beating and burning’ had taken place between 10
March and 25 March in the Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan provinces and
the Tibet Autonomous Region,” Li Bin and Li Yajie, “Inside Story of Dalai Clique’s
Manipulation of ‘Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement,‘“ Xinhua, 1 April 2008. Cited in
“China: Hundreds of Tibetan Detainees and Prisoners Unaccounted for,” Human Rights
Watch, 9 March 2009. The blog woeser.middleway.net (accessed 5 April 2008) cited an
official newspaper in Sangchu (Ch. Xiahe) in Gansu as stating on 23 March 2008 that “the
correspondent has learnt from the government of Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
in Gansu Province that during this incident 105 organizations which are directly subordi-
nate to the county and city, 27 towns and 113 working units under the towns as well as
22 village committees were seriously affected.” The International Campaign for Tibet, a
U.S.-based advocacy group, gave a figure of 130 protests between 10 March and 22 June
2008 (Tibet at a Turning Point: The Spring Uprising and China’s New Crackdown,
International Campaign for Tibet, Washington, D.C, 6 August 2008, pp. 19-22).
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had been no large-scale street protests in Lhasa explicitly
against the government for 19 years. 
In those years the economy had seen the most dramatic ex-
pansion in history, with double-digit growth in GDP in the
TAR in each of the preceding 14 years, a result of a fero-
ciously focused policy by Beijing of infrastructural develop-
ment, GDP growth, and financial subsidies for the western
areas of China and especially the TAR. In China, it seems
that this was taken to mean that the Tibetan population was
more contented. In addition, leaders in Tibetan areas were
reporting back to Beijing, and to the public, that as a result
of this economic progress and other factors, such as intensive
political education, Tibetans were increasingly supportive of
the regime and were no longer interested in the Dalai Lama
or in opposition to the government. This practice of misre-
porting by local leaders, and especially the phenomenon of
the centre believing such reports, is central to any analysis of
Chinese handling of Tibetan issues. This centre-periphery
informational asymmetry explains much of the disproportion-
ate impact of the 2008 protests within China; if it had not
encouraged misreporting of opinions in the area, the govern-
ment would have long known that unrest was to be expected.
In any event, they appeared to refute the proposition, seem-
ingly the basis of much Chinese policy towards nationalities
since the late 1970s, that increased wealth brings increased
social order and allegiance to the source of that wealth, the
Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). T he  p ol it i cs  of  ge ogr ap hy
The details of the protests indicate why these events had ex-
ceptional political significance for China’s leaders. The inci-
dents in the late 1980s had taken place mainly in Lhasa,
whereas the new events covered much of the Tibetan
plateau. Between 1987 and 1996, some 213 political
protests were reported from Tibet, of which 160 were con-
firmed, (6) but only 5 of these took place outside the TAR.
In the 2008 wave, 22 of the 95 reported incidents took place
in the TAR (including in some sparsely populated areas in
9N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
6. See “Demonstrations September 1987 to August 1992,” Tibet Information Network
Background Papers on Tibet - September 1992, Tibet Information Network, September
1992, and “Reported Demonstrations 1992-93: List,” TIN News Compilation, October
1993 - Reports from Tibet 1992-3, Tibet Information Network, October 1993, p. 31.
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far west and north of the TAR), while 75 occurred in the
eastern parts of the Tibetan plateau, either in the north-east-
ern region traditionally known as Amdo or in the eastern re-
gion known as Kham. In terms of current Chinese adminis-
trative areas, Qinghai saw at least 30 incidents, Sichuan had
23, and southern Gansu had 22. This means that among the
five province-level administrative entities in China with Ti-
betan areas, only Yunnan did not have protests. The incidents
at village or township level that have not yet been confirmed
and so not included in these numbers were also in eastern Ti-
betan areas, and the 40 or more incidents that have taken
place since April 2008 have been in the east as well. 
This is important not just because it shows that the area of
demonstrated discontent was far wider than in the past. The
Tibetan areas outside the TAR had much milder policies in
the 1980s, such that they were sometimes described as func-
tioning examples of nationality-state harmony even by West-
ern journalists, and as effective examples of local autonomy
and cultural respect. (7) Only these areas had Tibetan-
medium middle schools (there are none in the TAR), they
had not been affected by the martial law provisions of 1989,
and they had a much higher proportion of Tibetans in the
local leadership, with apparently more devolved forms of ad-
ministration. They had in general larger monasteries with
less interference in religious practice, extensive publications
in Tibetan, and dynamic cultural and intellectual activity in
Tibetan language – Tibetan writers, poets, unofficial jour-
nals, publishers, film-makers, bloggers, and musicians flour-
ished in these areas, dominating Tibetan cultural life. Every
Tibetan knew that state controls, at least since the protests
of 1987, were much more restrictive in the TAR than in the
eastern areas, and fieldwork by foreign scholars is almost en-
tirely confined to the eastern areas. Foreign tourists have not
been able to enter the TAR legally as individuals since
1989, but all the eastern Tibetan areas were made open to
individual foreigners, without any special permits, at least
ten years ago. Common sense would have predicted a much
higher level of satisfaction with China in the eastern Tibetan
areas than in the TAR since the early 1980s, and a loss of
that support signifies a serious shift in allegiance of Tibetan
peoples in those areas.
There are other reasons that might have led Chinese policy-
makers to feel concern at the increased unrest in Kham and
Amdo. Although the written language of those areas is al-
most identical with that of central Tibet, many of the spoken
dialects are mutually incomprehensible. The social system
before the Chinese take-over had been different: the large
manorial estates owned by aristocrats were a feature of cen-
tral Tibetan society that was not much known in the east.
And historically, most of the eastern areas had not been
ruled by Lhasa for centuries. In the early twentieth century,
the Lhasa government briefly recovered control of parts of
Kham, but eastern areas of Kham and the whole of Amdo
had been not been controlled by Lhasa for at least two cen-
turies. Although Lhasa had included in the 1913 Simla Con-
vention its claim to having a special role or interest in these
territories, when the PLA took over those areas during 1949
and 1950, Lhasa had not registered any formal complaints,
and at that time had only spoken of being invaded when the
Chinese troops crossed the Upper Yangtse into what is now
the TAR. Only in the late 1950s had there been nearly si-
multaneous protest in the eastern and western parts of Tibet,
and its recurrence is of historic significance. (8)
The exceptional character of this east-west congruence in
protest becomes clearer if we consider the demands made by
the demonstrators. The march by Drepung monks on 10
March is said to have had three specific, non-political de-
mands, such as the release of the five monks detained dur-
ing the whitewashing of the former residence of the Dalai
Lama in October 2007. The student protest at Northwest
Nationalities University on 16 March carried a banner sim-
ply saying “Sharing happiness and suffering of Tibetans”
(Bod mi’i skyid sdug mnyam myong). But such carefully cal-
ibrated statements were unusual. Especially after 14 March,
protests appear to have had little organisation and rarely had
single or specific demands or slogans, let alone tactically cal-
culated ones. The majority of accounts that describe slogans
or demands by protestors say that many calls related to the
Dalai Lama – one hand-written banner said, “Invite His
Holiness, strive for freedom” (Gong sa gdan zhu / rang
dbang rtsol) – and photographs of many protests show peo-
ple brandishing pictures of the exile leader. This differs from
protestors’ slogans in the late 1980s, which were typically
calls for independence or for the Chinese to leave Tibet.
This probably reflects the extent to which the Dalai Lama
in the last 20 years has changed the political focus of the
10 N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
7. See for example, Fred Lane, “The Warrior Tribes of Kham,” Asiaweek, 2 March 1994.
8. The protests in Amdo also seem to be closely linked to places where there were major
conflicts with the PLA, and alleged atrocities, during a campaign to repress dissent in
1957-58. Memoirs of these events have only recently begun to circulate in Tibet, either
by word of mouth or in unofficial publications such as Nus Blo, Nags tshang zhi lu’i skyid
sdug (“Boyhood Joys and Sorrows in the Nags Tshang family”), published privately by
the author in Xining in 2007, and the series Rin bzang gi mu ’brel zin tho (Rinzang’s
Serialized Notes), including Rin bzang, Nga’i pha yul dang zhi ba’i bcing grol (My
Homeland and Peaceful Liberation); Rin bzang, Nga’i pha yul dang gzab nyan (My
Homeland and Careful Listening); and Blo bzang Don ’grub, Nga tsho’i mi rigs dang nga
tsho’i bsam blo (Our Nationality and Our Thinking), all privately published probably in
Amdo, 2008.
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Tibet issue from independence to negotiations with China.
It also shows the spread of ideas by overseas Tibetan-lan-
guage broadcasters –Voice of America, Radio Free Asia,
and Voice of Tibet, based in the United States and Norway
and providing daily news reports of Tibet-related events in
the outside world since at least 1990. But the biggest single
reason for the Dalai Lama’s increased status within Tibet
has been China’s policy of attacking him, a policy it began
only in 1994 when it decided to make the Tibet issue prima-
rily about his personal standing and so repeatedly attacked
him in the press and required monks, nuns, and others to de-
nounce him. 
Reports about many incidents describe people shouting for
Tibetan independence: importantly, the protests indicate
that there is a widespread view among Tibetans that Tibet
was a separate nation in the past. In at least 11 incidents pro-
testors are known to have carried the Tibetan national flag,
which is banned in China and is extremely dangerous to dis-
play (in December 1988, armed police in Lhasa shot two
Tibetans dead at point blank range for carrying flags). Ten
of the 2008 protests with flags took place in eastern Tibet –
mostly in areas of Amdo where that flag had never flown be-
fore, which had not been under Tibetan administration for
centuries, and which before 1949 did not consider them-
selves to have been part of Tibet as a single polity. The use
of the flags does not necessarily show (as some have
claimed) that these protestors were demanding independ-
ence – the ubiquitous images of the Dalai Lama suggest
that, like him, they think Tibet was independent in the past,
but will nevertheless accept a negotiated solution, even if
some wish for independence in the future. But they do sug-
gest that the phenomenon of Tibetan nationalism and the
idea of Tibet as a distinct nation are much more widespread
than 20 years ago.C la ss  and pr ote st
The 2008 events showed another major difference from ear-
lier protests in post-Mao Tibet: the participants came from a
wide range of social classes and vocations. Over 90 percent
of political protests in Lhasa in the late 1980s were led by
monks and nuns, and on the few occasions when laypeople
were involved, they were usually from the new class of small
traders – petty urban entrepreneurs who by the mid-1980s
had just been given the chance to practice religion again and
to operate small stalls in the street market around the central
temple of the city. There were exceptions – seven political
incidents were staged by farmers in villages in 1993, two stu-
dents were famously arrested in 1988, and at least two sym-
bolic, non-political protests were staged by students in Lhasa
in 1989 and 1993 – but generally the range of participants
was narrow. This phenomenon seems to have been partly re-
sponsible for Chinese policy-makers concluding that increas-
ing the size and wealth of the Tibetan middle class (perhaps
no more than 5-10 percent of the population) would buy loy-
alty and diminish unrest, a key theory underlining their de-
cision after 1992 to increase the salaries and improve the liv-
ing conditions of government employees in Tibet. 
But even from the outline reports available so far, it is clear
that far more classes of people were involved in the 2008
events. Thirty percent of the 95 reported incidents took
place in villages or townships, and the proportion of rural in-
cidents is likely to be much higher once more information
becomes available. This must mean that a significant num-
ber of farmers took part, and in some cases nomads as well.
The majority of the remaining incidents took place in small
towns, often with populations of only around 5,000-10,000,
which in some parts of the world would be considered rural
communities. This means that in official terminology in
China these events would be classed as peasant unrest or up-
risings, and that they were staged by what is seen as the tra-
ditional power base of the Party – the social class that in the-
ory gained most from direct rule and land distribution by
China briefly in the 1950s and again after the disbanding of
communes in the late 1970s.
11N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
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Monks and nuns had staged the vast majority of protests in
the previous wave, and in 1994, after a decisive meeting in
Beijing called the Third National Forum on Work in Tibet,
the state had begun a formal practice of targeting all “reli-
gious professionals” in Tibet pre-emptively as inherent polit-
ical suspects. This was the rationale for the “patriotic educa-
tion” drive that from May 1996 had sent teams of Party of-
ficials to spend three months in every monastery and nun-
nery in Tibet to demand written statements of loyalty to the
state and denunciations of the Dalai Lama. The number of
monks and nuns in Tibet had been frozen and quotas fixed
at every institution. Semi-formal practices even emerged in
Lhasa of banning monks and nuns from entering official
premises, such as Tibet University, without advance permis-
sion. This profiling appears to have been intended to man-
age the chief sources of unrest. But only some 24 percent of
the Spring 2008 protests involved monks or nuns alone; the
other incidents were led by or included significant numbers
of laypeople. Monks staged the incidents in the first three
days from 10 March, but from that time on the bulk of the
incidents were dominated by laypeople. This was a major
departure from the previous pattern of protest. 
In the earlier wave of unrest in Tibet, there had been little
sign of involvement of the elite – officials, lamas, leading
businessmen, or lay intellectuals – in protests. It is still un-
clear if members of these groups took part in any of the
12 N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
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2008 protests, but 17 of the initially reported 95 incidents
were staged by students, including at four of the five Nation-
ality Universities (the special institutions designated by
China for training the future elite from non-Chinese nation-
alities) that have Tibetan departments. And among those
detained by the authorities in the sweep of suspects after the
protests, we find the intellectual and singer Jamyang Kyi, the
writers and bloggers Kunga Tsangyang (Kangnyi), Kunchok
Tsephel, Lobsang Kirti, Thuksam, Dokru Tsultrim, Lodro
Wangpo, Jamyang Phuntsok, and Go Sherab Gyatso; the
film-maker Dhondup Wangchen; the singers Dabe, Drolma
Kyi, Lhundrup, Tenzin, and Tashi Dondrup; the educators
Palchen Kyab and Sonam; the lama Phurbu Tsering; and
the AIDS/HIV educator Wangdu.
This suggests that the majority of 2008 incidents were
largely rural, staged mostly by laypeople, with significant in-
dications of elite involvement or support. These figures do
not resolve questions about the proportion of the Tibetan
population represented by the protestors – one Chinese es-
timate put the total number of participants at 30,000, about
0.5 percent of the Tibetan population. But it is clear that a
very wide range of social groups and classes were repre-
sented in substantial ways in the unrest, and that there was
a significant spread throughout Tibet across space and class
of support for the Dalai Lama and of belief in Tibet as a
separate nation in the past.T yp ol ogy of  p r ote st
The 2008 protests were distinctive for the relatively high
amount of violence that took place. This violence became
the chief feature of most representations of the events, espe-
cially in China, and was used as a determining factor in
framing public responses, with different groups either over-
stating it or denying it. However, the violence in the 2008
protests should be compared with previous incidents of sim-
ilar size and composition, since violence in Tibet usually oc-
curs only in protests involving large numbers of laypeople or
in rural incidents. In the 2008 protests, the number of par-
ticipants in each protest was many times greater than in the
previous wave, with probably at least 100 in each incident,
if not many more, rather than 20 or so in the past. More
than half the 2008 incidents involved laypeople, as opposed
to about a tenth in the previous wave. It is normal for large-
scale, lay-dominated protests to lead to violence, firstly
against the security forces, then against government prop-
erty, and thirdly, if not checked by police, against migrant
shops. (9) A rough comparison shows that in 2008 the pro-
portion of lay-dominated or rural incidents that became vio-
lent was about 36 percent, rather less than in the 1980s (c.
43 percent (10)). However, the number of deaths of civilian
bystanders, mainly ethnic Chinese, caused by protestors in
the Lhasa and Dechen riots of 14 and 15 March was far
higher than in any previous incident. 
There has been intense dispute over the number of Tibetan
protestors killed by security forces during the 2008 protests
or afterwards in custody, with figures ranging from eight to
more than 200. Chinese authorities have admitted that
troops opened fire at two protests in Sichuan in self-defence,
but have said that no firearms were used by troops in Lhasa,
which contradicts reports from eyewitnesses. The Chinese
authorities have said at one time or another that eight Ti-
betan protestors died in or shortly after the protests, but have
either implied that their forces were not responsible or have
later revised these reports. (11)
The distinctive features of the 2008 unrest become clearer
if we examine the typology of protests. We can divide them
into roughly six types:
Peaceful marches. These are pre-organised protests against
specific restrictions or policies, in which a large number of
people, typically monks or nuns, come together to hold a
march or sit-down. This was what the Drepung and Sera
monks did on 10 and 11 March, perhaps following a
Burmese model of monastic protest. These events were
mainly peaceful apart from scuffles when police tried to
make arrests. 
Flash-riots. A crowd forms spontaneously and very quickly
because of a rumour or incident in the area, such as the
protest of 21 February 2008 in Rebkong in Qinghai, and
the Lhasa and Dechen incidents of 14-15 March. (12) These
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9. In both the protest in Lhasa on 5 March 1989 and the protest in Lhasa on 14 March
2008, violence escalated from attacks on the security forces to widespread attacks on
ethnic Chinese shops because few or no police were sent to control the situation for
several hours. Bai Ma, chairman of the Qinghai Political Consultative Conference, said,
“It is regrettable that authorities in Lhasa failed to take firm action to control the situa-
tion during the first few hours of the March 14 riots,” and “heavy-handed and arbitrary
tactics only create more animosity” (Shi Jiangtao, “Solution over Tibetans is ‘more con-
trol,’” South China Morning Post, 26 April 2008).
10. Most of the 1987-96 protests involved very small groups of 10-20 people or fewer,
almost always monks or nuns. There was no violence in those incidents.
11. The Chinese authorities said that three protestors died in Lhasa on 14 or 15 March (one
had “jumped from a building when police came to arrest him” and two “were injured in
the mayhem” (Materials on the March 14 Incident in Tibet (I), Foreign Languages Press,
Beijing, 2008, p. 32); that four were shot dead in Ngaba on 16 March (the report was
removed the next day – see note 4 above); and that a Tibetan called Tendar died while
“awaiting trial for involvement in the protests” in Lhasa “from a disease” (“Police vio-
lence video a lie from Dalai Lama group,” China Daily/Xinhua, 24 March 2009).
12. On the Rebkong incident see Charlene Makley, “Ballooning Unrest: Tibet, State Violence,
and the Incredible Lightness of Knowledge,” in Kate Merkel-Hess, Kenneth L.
Pommeranz, and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (eds.), China in 2008: A Year of Great
Significance, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, pp. 44-56.
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typically are unfocused, tend to involve violence against prop-
erty, and can last a long time if there is no effective action
by security forces. They have no clear leadership, purpose,
or slogans, and appear to tap into general discontent or prej-
udices, and so often have an ethnic dimension. 
Protests supporting events elsewhere. These are focused
protests in rural villages or small towns in response to news
of an incident or anniversary elsewhere. These incidents
tend to have broadly shared objectives and slogans. They
may have improvised banners, and usually start with a march
to a particular site, probably a government building or office.
They may lead to violence against property or personnel,
usually the property of the government. The March 2008
protests at Lutsa, Ditsa (Qinghai), and Labrang (Gansu)
monasteries, and in Phenpo, Taktse, Medrogungkar (TAR),
Ngaba (Sichuan), Chone, Tsoe, and Luchu (Gansu) were
of this type, marking the anniversary of the 1959 Uprising
or responding to news of the 14 March events in Lhasa.
Protests against a local incident. These are also focused
protests in a rural village or small town but are in response
to a specific incident that has just taken place in the same
village or area, usually an abuse by local officials such as the
arrest of monks at a local monastery. Again, the demands
and targets are relatively specific. This happened in Drango,
Tongkor, Nyatso (Sichuan), Medrogungkar (TAR), and
other places from early April 2008 after patriotic education
teams or search squads entered local monasteries in late
March. 
Sympathy protests. These are vigils or marches that express
sympathy with those who suffered in previous protests, but
express no demands of their own. The student protests at
Nationality Universities were of this type. These were
peaceful and were not broken up by police.
Solo protests. These involve single people or very small
groups, often monks or nuns, staging symbolic protests in a
town centre, often with a banner. Such gestures, effectively
offering oneself up for arrest and beating on behalf of a com-
munity or cause, occurred increasingly in Sichuan from late
March 2008. They are often carried out by women. These
are always peaceful (though one case in Ngaba on 27 Feb-
ruary 2009 involved self-immolation) but have led to imme-
diate arrest, often very brutally, and in some cases protestors
have reportedly been fired upon.
The flash-riots of type 2 are not new to Tibet. The three
riots in Lhasa in 1987, 1988, and 1989 were against the
Chinese government and were not driven by ethnic animos-
ity, and the smaller riots in Lhasa in 1995, Chentsa (Ch.
Jianza) in Qinghai in 2002, and Golok (Ch. Guoluo) in
Qinghai in July 2007 were explicitly ethnic, in those cases
against Hui Muslims. Dispersed violence and ethnic attacks
are usual in incidents of this type, wherever in the world they
occur. The type 6 or solo incidents are similar to the major-
ity of protests in the 1980s phase. The protests of type 4 are
usually rural and often violent, and have seen a very major
increase in Tibet in the last year, but are similar in principle
to the numerous protests that occur across China. Consid-
ered alone, they might be less troubling to Chinese leaders
because they do not imply coordination or organisation and
in theory can be averted by local policy changes or by replac-
ing or disciplining local officials. 
The other three types of protest, however, are new: coordi-
nated Burmese-style peaceful marches or sit-downs by large
numbers of monks; village protests in support of events hun-
dreds of miles away or years earlier; and explicit gestures of
sympathy by elite students. The majority of events in March
of 2008 were village protests of type 3, mainly rural re-
sponses to the events in Lhasa on 14 March. Most protests
since the end of March 2008 have been of types 5 and 6 –
reactions to responses by local officials to the March events
(particularly the re-sending of patriotic education teams or
paramilitary troops into local monasteries). These forms of
resistance involve major sectors of the population not previ-
ously engaged in protest, and they imply effective knowledge
of history, rapid spread of news concerning Tibet-wide
events, and shared beliefs. In particular, the village protests
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of type 3 represent the largest Tibetan population group –
85 percent of Tibetans in the TAR live in the countryside.
With no tradition in villages for coordinated, peaceful
protest, a degree of violence in village incidents is likely de-
spite repeated calls for non-violence by the Dalai Lama. 
From this, we can identify the striking features of the 2008
protests: the flash-riots were more severe in the amount of vi-
olence involved, but this was related to the fact that the new
protests involved a far greater number of participants than
before in each incident; a far greater number of laypeople
among those participants; a much greater number of rural
people, students, and organised monks; and much faster
sharing of news and perceptions of shared interest across the
plateau. If we combine this with data on the geographic and
social spread of the incidents, we can see that the 2008
protests indicate the politicisation and radicalisation of previ-
ously dormant classes of lay Tibetans, particularly the farm-
ers and nomads of eastern Tibet, supported by students from
the new, middle-class urban elite and by increasingly sophis-
ticated monastic groups.D ise nta ngli ng r ep re se nta tio nfr om  c aus e
Why, then, has much of the discussion focused on the ques-
tion of violence? For political leaders, the primary question
is or should be why this major spread of political activity and
consciousness has taken place among Tibetans. Narratives
of violence help both sides avoid other questions and consol-
idate their positions. From a Tibetan point of view, violence
is by the Chinese state and exposes it as repressive, while at
the same time it justifies violence by protestors. From a Chi-
nese perspective, violence is by Tibetan nationalists and ex-
plains why strong, military measures were necessary, while
fuelling (for no clear reason) the claim that unrest was exter-
nally instigated. In fact, violence is emotively potent as an
image but may explain little about the causes of protest,
since it can occur for many reasons besides those that led to
the unrest. To explain the breadth of unrest one either has
to find evidence of coordinated instigation or to study sys-
temic factors such as government policies and social condi-
tions. In the Tibet case, however, the study of these ques-
tions has been largely replaced by disputes in the media over
the meaning and nature of the unrest, so that arguments
about causes are indistinguishable from the way they are pre-
sented. In this case, representation, and even public manip-
ulation of data, is used by all sides as a way to avoid un-
wanted answers to questions about causes. This may explain
why there has been little serious discussion in the Chinese
media about the causes of unrest. (13)
There were reasonable grounds for analysts to consider
whether the 2008 events might have been coordinated.
They involved similar political activity taking place at the
same time across great distances, to a degree that had not
happened before. On 10 March, there were five similar
events – peaceful protests by large numbers of monks – at lo-
cations (Lhasa in the TAR, and Ditsa and Lutsa in Qing-
hai) about 1,000 kilometres apart. This coincided with an
initiative by five exile groups in India to launch what they
called a “People’s Uprising,” which involved a “Peace
March” of 100 exile Tibetans starting from New Delhi on
that day with the supposed objective of crossing the border
into Tibet. The exiles’ declared plan was to stimulate activi-
ties that would upset the Olympic Games, due to open in
Beijing the following August and widely regarded as a test
of China’s acceptance into the international community. The
second round of protests, those that began with the riot in
Lhasa on 14 March, also showed near-simultaneous activity
across a wide area. The 90 or so incidents that took place
over the following month were not spread out evenly: at least
64, and probably many more, took place within 72 hours of
the Lhasa riot. This, too, could be considered a possible in-
dication of some kind of co-ordination.
Within hours of the 14 March riot, the Chinese media said
that the Dalai Lama had planned the events, including the
violence. Sections of the Chinese media implied that the
Dalai Lama had personally coordinated the protests and the
premeditated acts of violence. At higher levels of the leader-
ship the blame was placed more diplomatically on “the
Dalai clique.” As China’s Premier put it on 18 March,
“This incident was organised, premeditated, masterminded
and incited by the Dalai clique.” (14) Evidence in support of
this claim was published by the official Chinese press on 
31 March. (15)
However, this evidence was largely rejected by the interna-
tional media and politicians as insubstantial: it was either un-
verifiable or appeared to show the normal rhetoric of cam-
paign groups in exile that was directed towards the mobilisa-
tion of other exiles rather than those inside Tibet. Much of
it differed little from many years of similar sloganeering.
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13. The social and economic causes were raised in detail in China for the first known time
in a study by a Chinese NGO, Gongmeng or Open Constitution Institute (see Holzman’s
paper in this issue).
14. “China blames Dalai Lama for riots,” BBC World Service, 18 March 2008 at
http://news.bbc.co.uk /2/hi/asia-pacific/7302021.stm. 
15. “Dalai clique’s masterminding of Lhasa violence exposed,” China Daily, 30 March 2008.
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Scholars such as Tsering Shakya pointed out that exile ac-
tivists have shown negligible ability to organise anything in-
side Tibet or even to make significant contacts there, imply-
ing that much of their rhetoric, too, may be overstated. (16)
Underground organisations did operate in Tibet until most
were crushed by improved State Security operations in
1993, and any activities since then seem to have been lim-
ited to circulating information. Despite frequent pre-trial
media rhetoric about foreign instigation, in the last 20 years
the Chinese security services are not known to have pro-
duced a court case demonstrating any substantive link of ex-
iles to unrest in Tibet. (17) In the last five years an increasing
number of young Tibetans educated illicitly in exile schools
have moved back to Lhasa and other Tibetan areas, often
with ardently nationalist convictions, but their activities and
identities are so conspicuous to everyone that the security
services would certainly have had easy access to any efforts
they might have contemplated. As before, the state has gen-
erally accused these returnees only of circulating informa-
tion, not of planning protests or unrest.
The chief difficulty with claims of instigation is that easier
explanations abound. All the information necessary for
events to take place at roughly a similar time was circulating
worldwide in the international media, and these media out-
lets had been available for several years to most Tibetans
through short-wave radio and satellite broadcasts from
abroad. These broadcasts reach rural areas of Tibet more
easily than urban areas, around which jamming stations are
clustered. There was extensive publicity outside China and
on these radio stations about exile plans to disrupt the prepa-
rations for the Olympics and to hold a march in India on 10
March, the anniversary of the 1959 uprising that had led to
the Dalai Lama’s exile. It was implicit in these reports that
China would be less likely to use lethal force on protestors
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16. “Tibetan exile groups in India do get [U.S.] funding, but that does not translate into an
ability to mobilize in the PRC. There is a huge social and cultural gap between Tibetans
in India and those in the TAR, illustrated even by their taste in music” (Tsering Shakya,
“Interview: Tibetan Questions,” New Left Review 51, May-June 2008, p. 22).
17. As far as I know, the only documented case of exiles creating an incident inside Tibet
was the attempt to set off a small explosion at the 1985 celebrations of the 20th
Anniversary of the Tibet Autonomous Region. The device failed to go off.
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in the run-up to the Olympics, and it was well known that
the Dalai Lama was involved in advanced stages of talks
with the Chinese authorities, which protestors may have
hoped to influence. Once a protest happened in Lhasa,
news would have spread quickly across the Tibetan commu-
nity, since cellphone use among Tibetans is prolific, and
many eastern Tibetans live in Lhasa as monks, traders, or
state employees. Social networks in eastern Tibet would in
any case have been particularly engaged in events in Lhasa
on 10 March because the second protest in Lhasa that day
was staged by 14 monks from Amdo, and news of their de-
tention and beating would have spread quickly to their rela-
tives and fellow-monks in eastern areas. Some Chinese
cyber-activists have said that news of the Lhasa protests on
14 March was spread by foreign radio stations, and Western
media reported that the Chinese authorities did not allow
footage of the riot to be shown in mainland China until two
days after it happened (supposedly because of pressure from
Chinese nationalists who had seen images of the violence on
the web (18)), but some Tibetans in Amdo have said that im-
ages of violence in the Lhasa riot were shown on television
in their areas on 14 March. (19)
There were events that did show some planning and coordi-
nation, such as the largely peaceful marches by the Drepung
and Sera monks on 10 and 11 March with their careful slo-
gans and restrained tactics, though this degree of self-regula-
tion is to be expected from members of a single, closely con-
nected community. But these were not the protests featured
by the official media in China. Instead the Chinese media
and cyber-community focused on incidents that showed vio-
lence, chiefly the one in Lhasa on 14 March. To put it an-
other way, they discussed riots and ignored demonstrations.
Like most riots, the Tibetan ones were intrinsically chaotic
and did not show obvious signs of being organised, with no
prepared banners or focused objectives, and no obvious evi-
dence of leadership or management. Press accounts and of-
ficials in China focused on other, more subtle signs that
might indicate the presence of agents provocateurs in the
riots. A Hong Kong paper quoted a bystander in Lhasa (ap-
parently a Chinese person, but this information was with-
held) as saying that special knowledge must have been nec-
essary to know how to torch a car; some bloggers said that
special equipment must have been needed in order to burn
down shops quickly; other commentators reported that Ti-
betan protestors had carried backpacks full of stones. (20) The
Ministry for Public Security announced that some partici-
pants had confessed during interrogation to being paid by a
named former monk-convict to set fire to shops and attack
non-Tibetans. (21) Television and newspapers showed photo-
graphs of guns and other firearms police had found in a num-
ber of monasteries across the Tibetan plateau. (22) A more
elaborate theory by an independent writer in the U.S. tried
to prove that the protests were part of a secret plot planned
and funded by the Washington, D.C.-based National En-
dowment for Democracy. The writer is associated with pub-
lications arguing that the 2001 destruction of the World
Trade Centre was a conspiracy by the U.S. intelligence serv-
ices, and he later withdrew the article under threat of legal
action, but by then it had been given top billing on China’s
main television news program and had been reproduced in
many papers in China, Singapore, and Hong Kong. (23)
Among Tibetan exiles and their supporters, a similar array
of conspiracies was developed, which alleged that the riots
had been provoked by Chinese agents disguised as Tibetans.
These arguments had little strategic benefit for their propo-
nents except seemingly to allay embarrassment at the discov-
ery that Tibetans were capable of violence. A conspiracy-
theorist based in Canada published an article claiming that
British intelligence had satellite images showing that soldiers
had been seen changing into monks’ robes; an unnamed
Thai tourist was said to have told an exile that she had recog-
nised a Tibetan policeman among the rioters; the Falun
Gong newspaper Epoch Times published articles citing as
fact the unproven claims of Chinese dissident Tang Daxian
in 1989 that agents provocateurs had been used at that time
by the Chinese authorities to stir up riots in Lhasa; and Ti-
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18. See “State TV switches to non-stop footage of Chinese under attack,” The Guardian, 
18 March 2008, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/18/tibet.china1.
19. Mgar mi, “Zungs khrag dang tshe srog gi gtug bsher” (“The Case for Life-blood and Life-
force”), in Shar dung ri (The Eastern Conch Mountain), Vol. 21 (2008), p. 117. Published
in English translation in A Great Mountain, ICT, pp. 99-102.  
20. People in Lhasa knew immediately how to torch cars in the 1987 protest, since it is very
easy (one just lights a rag and inserts it in the petrol tank); the shops were torched
quickly because the arsonists only had to turn on and light the gas cylinders used in
each one for cooking or heating; stones were available everywhere in the city because
of construction sites. 
21. See “The truth about the severe criminal violence of attacks, destruction, robbery and
burning events on 14 March, Lhasa, Tibet” (in Chinese), Ministry of Public Security of the
People’s Republic of China, 22 March 2008. Accessed at http://app.mps.gov.cn:
9080/cenweb/brjlCenweb/jsp/common/article.jsp?infoid =ABC00000000000043861.
22. The description of these as weapon hoards were dismissed by Tibetans, who pointed
out that disused weapons are normally deposited in protector-chapels in monasteries
as part of certain rituals (See Bud Dha, Phyir rtog dang bsam gzhig (Hindsight and
Reflection), Shar dung ri (The Eastern Conch Mountain), Vol. 21 (2008), pp. 95-6; for
translation, see A Great Mountain, ICT, p. 84). There have been no claims by Chinese or
any media or officials since at least October 1987 that Tibetans have used firearms in
any protest.
23. F. William Engdahl, “Risky Geopolitical Game: Washington Plays ‘Tibet Roulette’ with
China,” Global Research, 10 April 2008. See Ji Gong (Ching Cheong), “Tibetan Riots: The
Crimson Revolution’s True Colour,” 19 June 2008 at http://english.chinatibetnews.com/
voices/2008-06/19/content_107704.htm, originally published as Ching Cheong, “The
crimson revolution’s true colours,” Straits Times, 22 April 2008. 
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betan bloggers argued that Chinese press photographs show-
ing Tibetan rioters holding unusually long knives had been
faked. A photograph of Chinese soldiers holding monastic
robes was circulated on the internet as proof that the soldiers
had been dressed as monks (though there was little involve-
ment of monks in the rioting in Lhasa). The photograph was
in fact a shot of soldiers dressing up to perform as monks
during location shooting for a Hong Kong film starring
Michelle Yeo, The Touch, in Lhasa in 2001. The claim that
this photograph proved that Lhasa rioters were Chinese was
repeated by the exile Tibetan Prime Minister and even re-
ferred to by the Dalai Lama, according to some reports. The
Chinese media ridiculed the claims by publishing an inter-
view with a soldier who had led the soldiers shown in the
photograph seven years earlier. (24)
These conflicting perceptions, each seeing the other in-
volved in premeditated deceit, were embedded within com-
plex webs of representation that had much more signifi-
cance and purchase than the conspiracy theories them-
selves. Each was founded in a basic perception about the
nature and cause of the events that had taken place, each
used a different term to describe those events, different im-
ages to personalise their core meaning, and different but
equally logical steps to lead people to starkly opposed polit-
ical conclusions. 
Two polar perceptions can be identified in this case, to-
gether with the secondary opinions that formed around the
cluster of associated ideas. The “A-type” argument, most
often associated with “the Chinese” (though it was of
course held by many who were not Chinese, and not held
by some who were), takes as its basic premise that the
events of March 2008 were riots (in socialist times, they
would have been termed rebellions), their principal charac-
teristic being randomised violence. The emotional impact of
this view was secured and reinforced by repeated showings
in the media of a limited stock of video footage and photo-
graphs of ordinary Chinese being pursued and beaten by
Tibetans with knives, and by images of Tibetan youths
breaking into shops. A number of photographs and articles
highlighted the involvement of monks in unrest. The images
and arguments that fuel this perception were heavily fea-
tured in presentations on the internet by ethnic Chinese ac-
tivists, both domestic and diasporic, such as a YouTube
video called “Tibet Was, Is and Always Will Be Part of
China” and the website anti-cnn.com, (25) but the circulation
of the same images and anti-exile accusations was heavily
promoted by the government too, such as in touring photo-
graphic exhibitions in China. (26)
From the A-type perspective, the random, incoherent qual-
ity of the violence appears as ethnic hatred and is directed
into an argument that explains, as if it were self-evident, that
the hatred is a result of Tibetan jealousy of Chinese and
Hui economic success. The jealousy is seen as manipulated
by the exile leadership or its Western allies, who use eco-
nomic difference to increase Tibetan nationalism and unset-
tle China. This leads to three principal conclusions: despite
their claims, the exile Tibetan leadership is secretly pursuing
independence while pretending to seek only autonomy; the
Dalai Lama is a hypocrite and liar trying to damage China
and trick the world; and Tibetans are planning terrorist op-
erations or are innately prone to violence. These conclusions
are implicit throughout official Chinese press responses to
the unrest, as well as in public writings on the internet. The
first two were directly stated almost verbatim in the official,
public rejection of the exile Tibetan proposal on autonomy
on 10 November 2008 by China’s top Tibet policy-makers.
The “B-type view,” associated with Tibetan exiles and their
supporters, uses the term “protests” to describe the unrest of
Spring 2008; among more ardent nationalists, the term “up-
rising” is used. The word “riot” is avoided even for the 14
March incident. The protests are described as largely peace-
ful. The key images that underscored this perception are
those of the protestors shot dead in Ngaba on 16 March,
and those of young women and monks who had been killed
in the protests or who have since disappeared. The unrest is
explained as uncontrollable frustration with China’s continu-
ing presence as an occupying force in Tibet or, depending
on one’s view, as responses to its on-going policies. Analo-
gies of the unrest with a boiling pot or pressure cooker, or
references to long simmering tensions, are often found. In
this argument, the conclusion is sometimes drawn that
China can be embarrassed by these revelations and loss of
stature and pressurised to change its policies. The secondary
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24. Gordon Thomas, “Beijing orchestrating Tibet riots: Brit spies confirm Dalai Lama’s report
of staged violence,” Canada Free Press, 21 March 2008; “China disguising soldiers as
monks to incite riots: Dalai Lama” IANS, 20 March 2008 at http://www.thaindian.com/
newsportal/uncategorized/china-disguising-soldiers-as-monks-to-incite-riots-dalai-
lama_10032556.html; “China rejects rumor of soldiers disguising as rioting monks,”
Xinhua, 31 March 2008 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/31/content
_7893926.htm.
25. For the video, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KNzRXNmSdM.
26. Photographic exhibitions showing large-format photographs of monks in the protests
toured China during the summer of 2008 (see “Truth of Lhasa 3.14 riots photo exhibi-
tion held in Guangxi,” China Tibet Information Center, 22 June 2008 at
http://eng.tibet.cn/news/today/200806/t20080622_408489.htm). 
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Soldiers claimed by exile leaders to be PLA
provocateurs dressing up as monks during the 14
March riot in Lhasa. In fact the photograph shows
soldiers working as extras on a Michele Yeo film, The
Touch, in Lhasa in 2001.  © TCHRD
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and more emotive concepts in this cluster stress the instances
of brutality by security forces, argue that Tibetans were un-
deserving victims, and, as we have seen, sometimes claim
that violence during the protests was instigated by Chinese
agents disguised as Tibetans. A general conclusion is drawn
that Tibetans are more or less united in their opposition to
Chinese rule, that the Chinese authorities lack moral or
practical legitimacy, and that the Tibetans are deserving for
humanistic reasons such as sympathy with their plight.
Among a more extreme subgroup of Tibetan radicals and
their supporters a more particular conclusion is drawn,
namely that the unrest proves that Tibetans inside Tibet
seek the restoration of Tibetan independence, and that the
efforts at negotiation by the Dalai Lama and the exile lead-
ership are politically, even morally, incorrect.F ra m ew or k  v ie ws a nd the irc onse que nces :  Nat ion ve r suss ta te
Some elements of these two positions seem similar. Both
seek evidence of conspiracies, both focus on violence, and
both see a sharp increase in nationalism among Tibetans.
But the differences become clearer if we attempt to iden-
tify the framing concept that is basic to each view. It
seems to me that at the core of the thinking of both groups
is the visceral conviction that the nation-state is the only
organising concept of politics and history, indeed of life in
all its public forms, much as Duara has suggested. (27) But
the groups are divided by radically different perceptions as
to what a nation-state is. The A-type group sees it and
thus all political life in terms of a state, in the sense of a
largely administrative entity that is entitled to demand cer-
tain forms of compliance from its citizens as long as it pro-
vides them with certain goods, and which is entitled to use
lethal force where necessary to protect the welfare of the
statistical majority. In this view, conflict between groups
within a community is inevitable because of different in-
terests, and only a state with such powers can contain and
balance conflicting interests. The key notions in the statist
view are, in the current Chinese context, conveyed by
terms such as “stability” and “harmony,” suggesting a nec-
essary and beneficial set of limitations on citizens in order
to maintain a larger, common equilibrium. Recently, pro-
ponents for this view have used the concept of Confucian-
ism as a culturalist explanation for this model, or have
pointed to the family as the fundamental unit of social
order in this approach. 
This view is similar to realist in general. The statist any-
where tends to see the world in mechanistic rather than hu-
manistic terms, as a necessary contrivance where conflicting
interests must be balanced. The nature and definition of the
state, like its borders, are indisputable, and economic rela-
tions seem self-evidently the most logical way to view and or-
ganise differences and interests. Arguments that frame Ti-
betans or other players as primarily economic agents driven
by a need for more resources, wealth, or income, are usually
operating within and reinforcing the statist view, often with-
out realising it. The notions of ethnicity, ethnic groups, and
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27. “The modern territorial nation and linear history have an intimate relationship. Indeed,
one might say that they co-produce each other as the principal mode of belonging in the
twentieth century. Individuals learn to identify with nation-states that have supposedly
evolved over a long history to reach the self-conscious unity of the two and are thus
poised to acquire mastery over the future” (Prasenjit Duara, “The Regime of
Authenticity: Timelessness, Gender and National History in Modern China,” History and
Theory, Vol. 37, Issue 3, October 1998, pp. 287-308. 
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ethnic conflict similarly belong to this framework, implying
an interests-based notion of groups whose competing drives
and needs can only be moderated and contained by a pow-
erful organ like the state. (28)
The B-type view appears to takes as its basic framework the
idea of the nation, which is seen as a largely indistinct her-
itage of intangible goods that belongs to one group of peo-
ple and no other, and that can only be sustained and fully
comprehended by members of that group. It sees a common
purpose, which is never a purely economic one, for that
group, a “spiritual principle” as Renan called it, (29) and it
sees interference with that principle by outsiders as a pri-
mary act of injustice or inhumanity. In many, though not all
cases, it is fused with an idea of territory as well, though it
can be based just as easily on language, customs, or religion.
It is driven by a notion of survival and a fear of extinction on
behalf of something that it celebrates as being by its nature
hard to define or identify. If it has to refer to the subsidiary
elements of the nation, the important ones are culture, his-
tory, and nature, not economics. Its primary concerns are not
with interests or duties but with rights and freedoms, and it
reaches for system-level change as a solution. It appears
often to envisage this collective thing it calls a nation as if it
were an individual, as an organic entity that has invisible
needs and anxieties like a person, and that is vulnerable and
prone to injury and weakness, needing to be nurtured, pro-
tected and sustained. 
Reducing the two positions to their primary differences and
their founding metaphors elucidates the gulf of incompre-
hensibility between them. In theory it also points to ways in
which common interests can be identified. As the cognitive
linguist George Lakoff has written of the rift that divides po-
litical factions in the contemporary United States: 
The Enlightenment theory of reason doesn’t describe
how people actually work. People think primarily in
terms of cultural narratives, stereotypes, frames, and
metaphors. That is real reason. …Realities matter. To
communicate them, you have to make use of real rea-
son. (30)
The B-type or nation-based perspective outlined here has al-
ready had important consequences, such as polarisation
within the exile Tibetan community between those who see
in the unrest of 2008 a mandate for the leadership to pres-
surise China to negotiate, and those who see it as a vindica-
tion of the pro-independence faction and a rejection of the
Dalai Lama’s concessional approach. For both groups, the
narratives of victimhood imply that the two communities,
those inside Tibet and the exiles outside, have a common
purpose, but provide none of the detail that would make that
story intelligible or useful. They demonstrate that many peo-
ple inside Tibet disapprove strongly of Chinese rule, without
indicating precisely which aspects of that rule they condemn
or which solutions they foresee as viable. 
The narratives generated by the statist or A-type view have
more serious effects, since in the Chinese case they have
been absorbed and recirculated, if not instigated, by a power-
ful government, as well as by Chinese cyber-activists. On the
one hand, this has seeded and nurtured a new wave of pop-
ular nationalism among many Chinese people, both inside
and outside China, in response to the Tibet unrest, so that
they feel empowered and entitled to challenge in their own
terms Western or hostile representations of China and its
policies. The new fenqing have achieved singular successes
in contesting foreign representations of Tibet and appear to
have influenced policy-making and public opinion at least
within China and its diaspora by providing coherent counter-
arguments or by stimulating threats of popular actions, such
as mass boycotts against French companies. This approach
appears to have been incorporated by Beijing in its interna-
tional relations, since it has significantly stepped up its threats
against Western leaders who plan to meet the Dalai Lama,
even cancelling an EU-China summit in December 2008 be-
cause of a planned meeting between the French President
and the Tibetan leader. For the new nationalists, their suc-
cess at cyber-politics comes at the cost of a larger loss in hu-
manistic vision: being able to persuade hundreds of thou-
sands of people that the Dalai Lama is a fawning hypocrite
demonstrates discursive power but questionable judgement,
since in the mid- to long-term nations stand to benefit from
moral heroes and advocates of reconciliation, even flawed
ones, rather than from destroying them.
For the Chinese government, the narrative of conspiracy has
had more serious consequences. Branding the Tibetan un-
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28. The “ethnicity” approach has grown in importance in China since the 1990s, as seen by
the decision by the state in about 1995 to change all official translations of the word
minzu from “nationality” to “ethnic” or “ethnicity.” The 2008 decision to change the
name of the Central University of Nationalities to “the Central Minzu University” also
suggests a decision among Chinese officials to avoid using the English word “national-
ity” to describe a group within China, since that word often describes a people that have
a separate state.
29. “A nation is a soul or spiritual principle.… A nation is therefore a huge solidarity, con-
stituted by the feeling of sacrifices that have been made, and which will continue to be
made.” Ernest Renan (1823-92) “What is a Nation?”, lecture to the Sorbonne, 11 March
1882, translation by Martin Thom from Homi Bhabha, ed., Nation and Narration, London:
Routledge, 1990, pp. 8-22.
30. “Don’t Think of a Maverick! Could the Obama Campaign Be Improved?”, George Lakoff,
BuzzFlash.org, 11 September 2008 at http://blog.buzzflash.com/contributors/1743.
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rest as foreign instigation allowed the relevant officials in the
area to stay in power and escape censure. It also created do-
mestic support for the state’s decision to crack down on Ti-
betans. But it also destroyed, or at least suspended for the
time being, two key mechanisms of the Communist Party
that have kept it in power – its ability to respond flexibly to
grassroots needs in time to avert major challenges, and its
foundational claim to give equal treatment to its citizens, or
at least to certain recognised groups of citizens such as the
55 minorities. Publicly accusing the Dalai Lama of person-
ally planning riots in Tibet would have cost the CCP little in
the long run if at the same time it had carried out grassroots
inspections in the Tibetan communities that staged riots and
protests in 2008 and identified which policies had fuelled
the unrest and needed changing. Although at least five in-
spection teams were sent to Tibet, it is said among Tibetan
officials that none of the participants dared to write in their
reports that the causes of unrest were failed policy rather
than instigation by the Dalai Lama or his colleagues. (31) A
year after the unrest began, despite public hints from high
ranking Tibetan leaders such as A Thrin (Ch. Acheng) and
Jampa Phuntsog (Ch. Qiangba Puncog) that identifying
failed policies is more important than conspiracies, (32) there
is no sign of any attention by Beijing to local concerns or any
reconsideration of its Tibet policies. 
Meanwhile the narrative within China of foreign threat has
led to a new perception of Tibetans as hidden terrorists or as
inherently violent. When a “dark-skinned man” was de-
scribed by a witness as having shot a soldier in Chongqing on
19 March 2009, even the China Daily, China’s foremost
English-language organ, announced that this meant that the
assassin was probably Tibetan. (33) For many urban Tibetans,
the most important indicator of current Chinese policies after
March 2008 was that they could not get admission to most
hotels when they travelled to the mainland, and that they
were singled out for special searches at Chinese airports be-
cause they were Tibetans. These new practices, still in force
at the time of writing, are more significant for many Tibetans
than the extensive and long-lasting restrictions on religion,
speech, or writing, because they invalidate the Party’s claim
to treat all nationalities equally – a claim that, contrary to
many foreign expectations, is quite widely seen in Tibet as
having been largely kept until now in terms of formal laws and
public policy statements. It is not hard for anyone to under-
stand why an authoritarian government bans Tibetans from
worshipping the Dalai Lama, since in Tibet he is more pop-
ular than state leaders, or why it refuses to allow street
protests to criticise their policies or historians to write freely
about the status of Tibet in the past, since these could under-
mine their legitimacy. But however much a realist one is, it is
hard to find logic to explain why the government in Beijing
has not overturned a policy that prevents Tibetans (and
Uyghurs, and sometimes Mongolians) from booking rooms in
hotels in Shanghai or Xi’an because of their ethnicity. 
The short-term benefits for China of representing the 2008
unrest as a foreign plot have thus produced a long-term prob-
lem, which is that the state is now increasingly likely to be
perceived by Tibetans as acting according to an agenda of
Chinese superiority and ethnic destiny. The difficulties and
tensions that modern China has asked Tibetans to see as a
problem of uneven development within a single nation-state
are now more likely to be seen by Tibetans in Tibet as re-
sembling colonial rule or endemic state discrimination, since
the dominant rhetoric in China and its cyber-activists exhibit
the hallmarks of that approach. Co nclus ion
In conflicts over representation, the represented disappear,
their voices muffled by the disputes among those who seek
to represent them. The distinctive feature of the Tibetan
case is that this struggle over representation is carried out
by outsiders, with little influence from the participants
themselves, a double stripping of autonomy. The muting
process is compounded by years of Chinese policy in
Tibet, which has since 1959 been designed to silence and
isolate internal expression and debate. Thus the images of
violence selected and circulated by outsiders become the
most influential element of the recent protests and shape
responses to them, and the complex and varied thinking of
protagonists inside Tibet becomes increasingly difficult to
discover. 
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31. Interview with a middle-ranking Tibetan official, 2009. Name and date withheld.
32. Jampa Phuntsog, Governor of the TAR, said: “There were all kinds of people [in the riot],
some of whom weren’t satisfied with our policies, or had opinions about them, or
because our government work hadn’t been fully completed. Not everyone was a split-
tist” (Lucy Hornby, “Tibet chief rules out ‘big problems’ during anniversaries,” Reuters,
5 March 2009). A Thrin, a former governor of Karze (Ch. Ganzi) prefecture, said “The
government should have more trust in its people, particularly the Tibetan lamas, most of
whom are not troublemakers” (Shi Jiangtao, “Is Beijing playing a no-win game?” South
China Morning Post, 12 March 2009), and a monk “is a citizen, … you need to pay
attention to him, take care of him and solve his problems” (Han Yanhong, “Sichuan
People’s Political Consultative Conference Vice-Chairman A Cheng said the Government
should first treat monks as citizens,” Lianhe zaobao, 9 March 2009). 
33. “Preliminary investigations suggest that the killer might be an ethnic Tibetan, the inside
source told China Daily, noting that a number of Tibetan separatists had sneaked into
town from Chengdu and were attempting to stage a bombing in downtown Chongqing,”
Tan Yingzi and Hu Yinan, “Fingerprints retrieved from robber who shot sentry dead,”
China Daily, 23 March 2009 at http://www.chinadaily.com. cn/china/2009-03/23/con-
tent_7607576.htm. Chongqing has a population of 30 million.
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Nevertheless, the likely causes of the Tibetan unrest can be
deduced from the main features of recent history. China oc-
cupied a largely unwilling and unfamiliar country that had lit-
tle knowledge of it in 1950, imposed direct rule against pop-
ular wishes in 1959, and then, through collectivisation, the
Cultural Revolution, and other persecution movements,
squandered the dividend it had obtained from the peasant
class by redistributing land. It created an even greater divi-
dend in the early 1980s by permitting cultural, religious, and
economic liberalisation and by promising a measure of au-
tonomy, and then threw much of the goodwill this obtained
by the gradual reintroduction in 1994, at the Third National
Forum on Work in Tibet, of small but critical restrictions on
culture and religion that Chinese officials believed necessary
to stem the growing strains of nationalism among Tibetans.
These restrictions included banning the worship and the dis-
play of photographs of the Dalai Lama, forcing “patriotic ed-
ucation” on monks and nuns, demanding that they denounce
their religious teacher, banning government employees and
students from any Buddhist practice, promoting all-out GDP-
expansion instead of developing human capacity, supporting
non-Tibetan migration of petty traders into Tibetan towns,
and banning public discussion of these issues. (34)
From a statist point of view, these impositions appeared tol-
erable and necessary because they were accompanied by ex-
tensive investment in Tibetan towns and massive boosts in
the wages of the small urban Tibetan middle-class, or at least
those who worked in the government sector: the state had
balanced coercion with emoluments. To Tibetans, both
those in government jobs who benefited financially and
those who lost out to migrants or to urban elites, the idea of
trading cultural and religious entitlements for economic ben-
efit may have seemed peculiar if not pernicious; it stretched
tight the already taut bargain on which the contract with the
state was based. In brief, the problem of the Communist
Party in Tibet has always been that while it has proved itself
capable of delivering material benefits to some sectors of the
Tibetan population in return for absolute compliance, it has
repeatedly followed the delivery of these goods with at-
tempts to manage and reshape cultural and religious life. 
This pattern of squandering political capital by interfering in
cultural life recurred in late 2005 when a hard-line Chinese
leader called Zhang Qingli was appointed as the Party Sec-
retary of the TAR. His two predecessors had been relatively
mild by local standards, and there was no obvious reason for
an official of this type to be sent to Lhasa. His arrival coin-
cided with a chain of renewed restrictions on culture and re-
ligion and an increase in policies that promoted migration of
non-Tibetans. In 2006 the state began a series of social en-
gineering projects that unsettled social life: in the TAR the
“comfortable housing project” forcibly moved at least a quar-
ter of a million Tibetan farmers from their villages to new
homes alongside major roads, while in eastern Tibet the “en-
vironmental migration” policy forced nomads to move to vil-
lages without any clear prospect of future income, obliged to
abandon their animals and lifestyle. At the same time the
authorities in the TAR rejected advice from local scholars to
reintroduce restrictions on migration to compensate for the
demographic impact of the opening of the Qinghai-Tibet
railway in 2006. 
By this time, the restrictions prescribed by the Third Forum
in 1994 had already been extended from the TAR into east-
ern Tibetan areas, including patriotic education drives, bans
on worship of the Dalai Lama, and restrictions on display of
his photographs. Tibetans may or may not have overall polit-
ical community of purpose, depending on whom one be-
lieves, but they certainly have common aspirations and val-
ues in terms of religion and culture, looking to Lhasa and the
Dalai Lama as their cultural centre, and it was the views of
these that Zhang and other officials appeared increasingly to
be attacking. In these circumstances it is not surprising that
criticism of Beijing spread across the plateau, reuniting
groups that historically had differed politically but had strong
cultural commonalities. Neither is it strange that some saw
the Olympic year as a crucial, perhaps final, opportunity to
push Beijing to change its policies before the Dalai Lama
became too old to lead negotiations, should they be allowed.
The monks who staged the first events on 10 March would
hardly have needed any contact with any exiles to work out
why that date offered an opportunity for them to try to get
the attention of the leaders in Beijing rather than the satraps
in Lhasa, at a moment when they rightly deduced that po-
lice would initially be under orders not to open fire or beat
them publicly.
In the volatile climate that local policy-makers had created,
any efforts of exile activists within Tibet would have been of
secondary significance: the spreading of nationalism in Tibet
was in large part a result of provocative policies by China
such as its attacks on the Dalai Lama. 
When unrest broke out in Lhasa on 14 March, the triggers
for the subsequent events were probably technology, as in
any modern society, not conspiracy: the news travelled in-
stantly across the plateau because of images of the riot
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34. See Robert Barnett with Mickey Spiegel, Cutting off the Serpent’s Head: Tightening
Control in Tibet, 1994-95, Human Rights Watch and Tibet Information Network, 1996.
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shown repeatedly on Chinese television, together with cell-
phone calls from relatives and friends in Lhasa and else-
where. The violence and ethnic attacks in three of those
protests dominated discussions by outsiders, but violence
and unrest are likely outcomes in any city in the world where
an indigenous majority sees abrupt and rapid immigration by
other ethnic groups that it associates with marginalisation of
its own interests and traditions. A violent outcome was more
likely in Lhasa than in other cities of the world, since the
local authorities had for decades outlawed any discussion of
these demographic issues. 
The consequence of protest has been in the short term costly
– unknown deaths, innumerable arrests, military patrols in
the streets of Tibetan quarters even in Chengdu, a closing of
Tibet to foreigners and journalists, a decimating of monk
numbers in the main monasteries, a political atmosphere that
leads to increasing disenchantment among Tibetans with the
Chinese state, a radicalisation of opinion among both Ti-
betan and Chinese nationalists, a collapse of talks between
Beijing and the Dalai Lama, and damage to relations be-
tween China and other powers. These events continue the
on-going pattern of resistance to Chinese efforts over a hun-
dred years to impose direct rule over Tibetans instead of the
relative success of its attempts at indirect governance through
delegated authority. That resistance flares up particularly, and
often violently, when direct rule by Beijing goes beyond po-
litical management to what are seen as arbitrary restrictions
on religious and social practices. Until those issues are re-
solved, the questions about whether modern Chinese state-
building can include those who are not ethnically Chinese,
and whose primary allegiance may be to their nation rather
than the state, are likely to remain unanswered. •
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